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This paper is an examination of the foreign policy
attitudes of Indiana's united States Senators and Repre-
sentatives during the critical years before the Second
World War. My purpose is to determine whether these par-
ticular Mid_Westerners were a part of the isolationist
bloc in Congress which exerted a significant influence
on the formulation of foreign policy, The scope of the
study is limited to an elucidation of the individual
views as expressed in Congress by the members of the
delegation and an analysis of the campaign for re-el
ec
-
tion waged by each of them as it relates to the broader
PREFACE
lssue.
The principal source is the ~ongression.l Record
for the First, Second, and Third Sessions of the Seventy-
sixth Congress and the First Session of the Seventy-
seventh Congress. Although committee hearings were con-
SUlted, there proved to be inadequate participation 10
the hearings to provide supplemental information, How-
ever, comments made during floor debate on the critical
measures enunciate the views of most members so as to pro-
vide an invaluable insight into tileopinions of the dele-
gation.
Floor discussion coupled with the roll call votes
iii
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on the bills which clearly delineate the positions held by
the members permit certain conclusions to be made regarding
the posture of the delegation as individuals and as an entity.
The election of 1940 was analyzed by reading articles
from at least one newspaper from each congressional district
for the months of September, October, and November of 1940.
However, the congressional campaigns that year were not given
extensive coverage by the newspapers, which concentrated on
the Wilkie-Roosevelt presidential campaigns. The only avail-
able manuscript collections in Indiana are the Ludlow and
Halleck papers which are a part of the Lilly Library Col-
lection at Bloomington. The Halleck papers for these years
are almost exclusively concerned with constituent services
and contain no mention of foreign affairs. On the other
hand, the Ludlow papers are primarily concerned with his
resolutions calling for a constitutional amendment to re-
qUire a war referendum. Because he was a Representative
who spoke out openly and frequently, Ludlow's attitudes
were easily ascertained and the manuscript materials
merely supply further affirmation of his views. Manuscript
materials are unavailable for the Representatives and Sena-
tors who were less vocal in expressing their opinions and
for lifhomsuch materials would have been immensely valuable.
The most important secondary sources are Robert A.
Divine's The Illusion of Neutrality which is a detailed
presentation of the congressional debate over neutrality
legislation through 1939 and Warren Kimball's The Most
vUnsordid Act, a description of the genesis of Lend-Lease and
its passage by the Congress. Also useful for general back-
ground information are Manfred Jonas' Isolationism ln America
and William Langer and Everett Gleason's two books on this
period, The Challenge to Isolation and The Undeclared War.
The Congressional Directories and The Biographical Directory
S?f the American Congres2_ are the sources of biographical
information concerning each member of the delegation. Pages
on which this information is found are listed in the Bibli-
ography and will not be footnoted in the introductory section.
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jealousies. Reconciliation of the two philosophies occurred
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INTRODUCTION
American foreign policy may be viewed historically as
a quest for compromise between internationalism and isolation-
One approach advocated a prominent and active role in
world affairs for the United States while the other warned
lsm.
against entanglements in centuries-old European hatreds and
because Americans conceived of their country as a nation com-
mitted to expansion of its foreign commerce, as a haven for
immigrants, and as a nation hopeful that its institutions
would serve as a model for the rest of the world.
,
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Consequently, the intense battle over foreign policy
during the 1930's was not fought to restore or to continue
a genuine isolation. Instead, it was a struggle to preserve
the American government's absolute control over its foreign
policy by avoiding any long-term political commitments to
other nations. The isolationists of this era advocated a
I
kind of unilateralism which would allow the United States
to act in accordance with the dictates of national self-
interest.
An intense debate took place during the years before
the war because the two groupS, the internationalists and the
isolationists, were unable to agree upon which course of
2action would actually best serve the national interests.
During the three critical years before the United States
entered the war, the debate was acted out in Congress where
a small group of isolationist-minded Senators and Represcnt-
atives were able to playa substantial role in the formula-
tion of the nation's foreign pOlicy. Their greatest achieve-
ment was the passage of a series of neutrality measures whic h
by 1939 President Roosevelt wished to revise. His efforts to
repeal various sections of the Neutrality Act of 1937 provide
a continuous thread running throughout the period, ending
finally less than one month before the United States declared
war against Germany and Japan.
A measure which provoked a violent and emotional
reaction from the isolationists in Congress was the Presi-
dent's request in 1940 for authorization to conscript men
for military service. This was the first time in the na-
tion's history that peacetime conscription had been pro-
posed. Such a request by the President confirmed the anti-
interventionists! suspicions that Roosevelt was intent upon
leading the nation into war.
The third major issue to come before the Congress and
incite massive resistance from the isolationists was the
Lend-Lease proposal. Although the President was assured of
sufficient votes to pass Lend-Lease, the minority opposing
it in the House and Senate fought to impose crippling re-
strictions on the measure.
3These, then, were the significant issues before the
Congress during 1939, 1940, and 1941 against which an unre-
lenting group of Senators and Representatives rallied. Such
isolationism has traditionally been identified with the Mid-
dIe Western region of America. The corollary that the Indiana
congressional delegation was composed of men with isolationist
convictions begs to be investigated. Under careful scrutiny
do the attitudes of Indiana's Senators and Representatives ex-
hibit characteristics of isolationist convictions and do they
support the proposition of Mid-Western isolationism?
Preliminary to a discussion of the issues and atti-
tUdes, a brief comment on thB political situation in Indiana
during the 1930's and an introduction to the members of the
congressional delegation follows:
Significant changes in the economic well-being of
large portions of the population are usually reflected in
political activities. The Depression affected Indiana as
it did the entire United States, and economic instability
became a personal problem for many families. The Republi-
cans who were in control of the state as well as the nation
were held responsible for their misfortunes by the voters
of Indiana.
The election of 1932 was a sweeping and decisive
Victory for the DemocratiC party. Roosevelt and Garner
and the DemocratiC nominee for Governor, Paul V. McNutt,
and his state ticket carried Indiana. Democrat Frederick
4Van Nuys was elected to the Senate in place of the h- dt I 1r -
term incumbent James Watson. A solidly Democratic delega-
tion was sent to the U.S. House of Representatives.l
Most of the agencies created by President Roosevelt
for d frelief, recovery, an re-orm purposes operated in Indiana,
and the mid-term elections of 1934 thus favored the Democrats ,
although not in the landslide proportions of two years earl-
ler. The Republicans were able to elect one congressman, but
the Republican senatorial incumbent was defeated by Sherman
M'inton. Z
The elections of 1936 in Indiana were largely dominated
by national issues and national candidates. The Roosevelt
Administration was endorsed by the Indiana voters who gave
the Democrats nearly a two_hundred-fifty-thousand vote mar-
gin. M. Clifford Townsend, the Democratic nominee for Gov-
ernor, defeated his Republican opponent, Raymond F. Springer,
and the Republicans managed only to retain their one seat in
Congress.3
President Rooseveltts efforts to reorganize the Su-
preme Court in 1937 had serious repercussions within the Demo-
who opposed Roosevelt's attack on the Court although he had
cratic party in Indiana. Senator Van NUYs was among those
lJohn D. Barnhart and Donald F, Carmony, Indiana From
Frontier to Industrial Commonwealth, Volume II (NeW"Yorlc:
Lewis Historical publishing Company, Inc,, 1954) pp. 476-479.
ZIbid., r 479.
3l_bid., p. 481.
5otherwise supported the New Deal. Substantial ill-feelinat»
within the party in Indiana was created when President
Roosevelt decided to purge Van Nuys from the Senate and
gained the support of Governor Townsend in this effort.
Republicans saw in the 1938 elections an opportunity to
The
cap-
ture a Senate seat and nominated Raymond E. Willis, an Angola
newspaper editor and publisher. However, at the last minute
Governor Townsend retracted his opposition to Van Nuys, who
had declared he would run as an independent if denied the
nomination by his party, and the Democrats renominated him,
By this time the New Deal was not going well in Ind-
lana even though many benefits accrued to the citizens of
the state as a result of the relief and recovery programs,
lncreased agricultural prices, and establishment of unem-
ployment insurance. However, poor relief necessitated high
local taxes and agricultural benefits had resulted in near
regimentation. Business had become increasingly hostile to
the regulatory provisions of the reform measures. Prosperity
was slow in returning, and a serious recession had interrupted
their traditional conservatism began to reassert itself.
the recovery in 1937. Indiana citizens became restive, and
Senator Van Nuys was ye-elected although by a margin of less
than five thousand votes,
The Republican vote was greater
than at any election since 1932 and the Democratic vote
Republican candidates for
smaller than in 1932 and 1936.
Congress were successful in seven districts wh iLe the Demo-
6crats retained five seats.4 The Indiana delegation to the
76th Congress, thus, was composed of two Democratic Senators
and five Democratic and seven Republican members of the House
of Representatives.
William Theodore Schulte, a forty-eight-year-old
Democrat from Hammond, represented the First Congressional
District composed entirely of Lake County, the highly In-
dustrialized, immigrant-populated northwestern corner of
the state. Representative Schulte had served from 1918 to
1922 as a member of the city council of Hammond prior to
his election to Congress in 1932.
From the lower northwestern, primarily rural, Second
District, Charles A. Halleck was sent to Wasllington by the
voters of Benton, Carroll, Cass, Fulton, Jasper, Kosciusko,
Marshall, Newton, Porter, pulaski, Starke, Tippecanoe, and
White Counties. Included in this District were the cities
of Lafayette and Logansport as well as the smaller towns of
Fowler Winamac and Delphi. Halleck, who was born in Jasner
, _ , 1
County in 1906, had graduated from Indiana University in 1922
and its law school in 1924. For a time he had practiced law
in Rensselaer and served as a prosecuting attorney for the
30th judicial circuit for ten years. Ilalleck was first
elected as a Republican to the 74th Congress to fill the
vacancy created by the death of the Congressman-elect.
Another Republicclllattorney was elected to his first
4Ibid., p. 486.
7term in 1938 to represent the northern border counties of
Elkhart, LaPorte, and St. Joseph which comprised the Third
Indiana Congressional District. These three counties, like
Lake, had a substantial proportion of foreign-born population
living in their principal cities of South Bend, LaPorte, and
Elkhart. The youngest member of the delegation, Robert A.
Grant, thirty-three at the time of his election, represented
this area.
The son of Scottish parents who moved to the United
States in 1882 with their two-year-old son, George W. Gillie ,
a Republican from Fort Wayne, was another freshman member of
the 76th Congress. Gillie was a doctor of veterinary medi-
cine whose previous public service had consisted of six years
as sheriff of Allen County. He represented the northeastern
counties of Adams, Allen, DeKalb, LaGrange, Noble, Steuben,
Wells, and Whitley, which by this time were becoming more
densely populated as they turned from agriculture to manu-
facturinF",'
Decatur, Auburn, and Angola were in this District.
The north central counties of Blackford, Clinton,
Gran t, Howard, Huntington, Jay, Mi.ami , Tipton, and Wabash
belonged to the Fifth District and another first-termer,
Forest A. Harness. In this District Frankfort, Marion,
Hun t tnct on and Kokomo were growing into small ci ties.
c» .,
Born
at Kokomo in Howard County in 1895, Harness had graduated
from the 1aw department of George t own Univcrs ity in 1917 and
served overseas during the World War as a first lieutenant
in the infantry, remaining a captain in the Infantry Reserve
8of the Army from 1920-1949. He practiced law at Kokomo, was
prosecuting attorney for Howard County for four years and was
a special assistant to the Attorney General of the United
States from 1931 until 1935 when he resumed the private prac-
tice of law until his election in 1938 as a Republican to the
United States House of Representatives.
Legal practice and service as both deputy and prose-
cuting attorney were also in the background of Noble Johnson
of Terre llaute, a Vigo County resident since his birth there
In 1887, Johnson, a Republican, was first elected to Congress
In 1924 and served through the two succeeding Congresses. Al-
though he ran and lost in 1930 and again in 1936, Johnson was
victorious in 1938. His was the Sixth District, composed of
the centrally-located counties of Boone, Fountain, Hamilton,
Hendricks, Montgomery, Parke, Putnam, Vermillion, Vigo, and
Warren. Terre Haute was the largest city in this primarily
agricultural area wltich also included the smaller towns of
Lebanon, Noblesville, and Rockville.
The former athletic director and business and law in-
structor of the Linton Iligh School, Gerald Landis was elected
in 1938 from the Seventh District counties of Clay, Daviess,
Gibson, Knox, and Sullivan. Landis was a forty-three year-
old native of this rural area including Sullivan, Brazil, and
Vincennes.
John William Boehne, Jr., the son of a former member
of Congress from the Eighth District, was elected to his fifth
~~~~...-.~.~~:.......----
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term ln the United States House of Representatives in 1938.
Born in Evansville in 1895, Boehne graduated from the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin in 1918, served one year with the U.S. Army
during the World War, and returned to Evansville, the major
city of the District, to become secretary and treasurer of
Indiana Stone Works, The Vanderburgh County Democrat also
represented Crawford, Dubois, Floyd, Harrison, Perry, Pike,
Spencer, and Warrick counties whicll composed the rural south-
western corner of the state.
Another Democrat fifth-termer from southern Indiana ,
Eugene Crowe, was a sixty-year-old former businessman. His
Ninth District included the sparsely populated rural counties
of Bartholomew Clark. Dearborn, Franklin, Jackson, Jefferson, ' '
Jennings, Lawrence, Ohio, Orange, Ripley, Scott, Switzerland,
and Washington. Columbus and Madison were the principal cities
ln this District. Crowe was the only Indiana Congressman to
be defeated in the election of 1940. He was replaced by Re-
pUblican Earl Wilson, a thirty-four-year-old high school
teacher and principal from Bedford.
Republican Raymond Springer of the Tenth District
was born in 1882 and attended Earlham College, Butler Uni-
versity, and the Indiana University Law SCllool at Indianapolis
from which he was graduated in 1904. He practiced law for
twelve years and was judge of the 37th judicial circuit from
1916 until 1922. During the World War Springer served as an
infantry captain and was a lieutenant colonel in the Officers
Reserve Corps from 1918 until 1946. The unsuccessful Repub-
__~ __ .. _ ...-r:_.;,_...;._~ ~.'-J~r'" ~.~.~ "-" " '--~.'.' < •
. . _ .•__ .c._o~~ ••-_' _.~" >_._~ .....- -C-""~~~
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lican candidate for Governor of Indiana in 1932 and 1936,
Springer was elected to the U.S House of Representatives
in 1938 to represent the eastern counties of Decatur, Dela-
ware, Fayette, Henry, Randolph, Rush, Shelby, Union, and
Wayne. Another District much like the Fifth with its small
town configuration, the Tenth included Elwood, Muncie, Alex-
andria, and Richmond.
The eldest member of the Indiana delegation was
William Larrabee, who was born in 1870. He began practicing
medicine and surgery at New Palestine in 1898 and served as
secretary of the Hancock County Board of Health and as a
member of the New Palestine City Council before his election
to the Indiana House of Representatives in 1923 and 1925.
Elected from the urban Eleventh District to the 72nd Congress
ln 1930, Larrabee represented Hancock and Madison Counties
as well as the Marion County townships of Franklin, Lawrence,
Perry, Warren/ and all of Center except the area northeast
of Ward 6, including nine wards of the city of Indianapolis.
The remaining Marion County townships of Decatur, Pike,
Washington, Wayne, and that part of Center not in Doctor
Larrabee's District were represented by the most colorful
member of the Indiana delegation, Democrat Louis Ludlow. Born
in rural Indiana near Connersville, Ludlow went to work in
[ndianapolis in 1892 at age nineteen as a reporter for the
Indianapolis Sun. His beat included the State House and
Ludlow met many important figures in Indiana politics before
he left the state in 1901 to become the Washington correspond-
11
ent for a number of Ohio and Indiana newspapers. A member
of the Congressional Press Galleries until 1928, Ludlow was
then elected to represent Indiana in the House of Representa-
tives.
In an autobiography, From Cornfield to Press Gallery,
written in 1924 just four years before his election, Ludlow
explained that he had difficulty classifying himself politi-
cally even though his father had been a staunch Democrat.
I had no trouble keeping my politics on
fairly straight until Woodrow Wilson be-
gan to project America into the inter-
national sphere and to proclaim Uncle
Sam as the partner and paymaster for all
of the unruly, trouble-breeding, busted
nations of the world. As nearly as I
can ascertain from careful introspection,
I am today a Democr~t natio~ally and a
Republican internatlonally.-
Ludlow discussed his belief in the Jeffersonian principles of
equal rights and democracy. Coupled with his father's rigid
adherance to the Democratic party this belief must have been
sufficient to cause him to consider himself a Democrat when
he decided to run for office.
There is no discernible evidence such as an intensely
religious upbringing to Suggest why Luellow was to become such
However, by 1924 his con-an ardent and outspoken pacifist.
victions were already strong enough for him to write,
Persons who decry the so-called isolation
policy as selfish do not know whereof they
SLouis L. Ludlow, From Cornfield to Press Galler
(Washington, D.C.: W.F. Roberts Company, Inc . , 1924), t.
p. 400,
12
speak. It is the only way America can pre-
serve its strcngth and capacity for doing
good dgeds for the benefit of humanity every-
where.
At the same time, Ludlow stated his firm belief in the need
for an amendment to the Constitution to provide for a refer-
endum on war, an objective wh ich was to become the primary
focus of his efforts as a Congressman during the years ahead.
T\'JO Democrats represented Indiana in the United States
Senate during the 76th Congress. Sherman Minton of New Al-
bany was a forty-eight-year-old attorney who had received
his LL.B. from Indiana University in 1915 and an LL.M. from
Yale University in 1916. He had served as a captaill in the
Army during the World War and then as a captain In the ()f-
ficers Reserve Corps. Minton was first elected to the Senate
in 1934, following a term as public counselor for the state
of Indiana in the Administration of Governor McNutt. lIe
made known his sympathies with the New Deal soon after his
arrival in Washington and was offered the Senate's ilssistant
~)emocrat leadership after the death of Senator .Joseph Ro hin-
son. The Indiana Senator was most active on the Lobby Com-
mittee of the Senatc, set up to investigate the enti.re lobby-
ing situation in Washington. lIe was a member of the Committee
in 1935 and its chairman in 1937, a position whicll caused
:Iinton to become a subject of controversy. III 1~)/!1 President
Roosevelt appointed Minton to the White llouse stelff as !\d-
ministrative Assistant and then as judge of the Seventh
---------------
6 lJ) i d., p. 4 0 2 .
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Circuit Court of Appeals where he remained until 1949 when
he was appointed an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court by President Harry S, Truman.
Indianafs senior Senator, Frederick Van Nuys, was
first sent to the U.S, Senate in 1932. Another attorney,
Van Nuys had served in the Indiana Senate from 1913
through 1916 and was chairman of the Indiana State Demo-
cratic Committee during 1917 and 1918. Van Nuys, born in
1874 in Rush County, was a graduate of Earlham College and
Indiana University Law School in Indianapolis.
Indianafs senatorial delegation changed h'ith the 77th
Congress as a result of the defeat of Sherman Minton in the
election of 1940 by Raymond Willis, an Angola newspaper edi-
tor and publisher. Sixty-five years old when elected, Willis
had been a member of the Indiana IIouse of }\eprcsentatives
eluring the 1919 and 1921 Ceneral Assemblies.
CHAPTER ONE
NEUTRALITY REVISION
76TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION
During the years following the World War, the United
States gradually began turning inward as evidenced first by
its failure to join the LeaguE of Nations. The advocates of
collective security met with great frustration during the
19201s and early 1930's as evidenced by their untiring and
equally unsuccessful efforts to bring the Uni.ted States into
membership on the World Court.
The War had made America the world's creditor, a
status of increasingly grave consequence in the shaping of
attitudes during the inter-war years. The tangled Har debts
problem resulted from the inability of the Cermans to meet
their reparations obligations wh i.ch in turn prevented the
Allies from meeting their loan repayments. Proposals to
cancel the Allied War Debts were becoming more frequent by
the late 1920's. Finally, because of the world-wide economic
crisis the IIoover Moratorium on reparations and Hal' dob t s IJas
established. When the Moratorium expired a settlement \Vas
reached wh i ch for all intents and purposes rejJud:iated the
war debts. This result of the Depression intensified the
growing isolationism in the United States.
14
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The widespread publicity surrounding the investigation
of the munitions industry conducted by a specially created
Senate committee under the direction of Senator Gerald Nye
of North Dakota increased the disillusionment of the American
people. Nye, who himself had long been convinced that the
United States had been drawn into the war because of profit-
seeking weapons makers, was able to popularize his theory.
Eventually, reeling became widespread that American entry into
the WeU had been a tragic mistake which shou ld not be repeated
and a pervasive desire for noninvolvement resulted.
However, German activity in Europe anu Japanese
activity in the Far East caused the question of America's
role in international affairs to be posed once again. Both
those who believed the Uniteu States shoulu remain uninvolved
and those who preferred a system of collective security in
the world arrived at agreement upon the need for a change in
the nation's neutrality policy.
With the impending Italo-Eithiopian war acting as the
catalyst, pressures for neutrality revision increaseu during
the early months of 1935.1 The problem of formulating :111
American policy toward foreign aggression had occupied the
Congress, the Department of State, and international Lawy crs
for some time. With the imminent threat to world peace, the
public became more aware of the possible effect events t:lking
p I.accab raad caul d have up ant 11e 5 ecur ity 0 f the Un ite cl SLJ tcs .
Inobert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality, 1937-
1941 (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 81.
III
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As the foreign situation worsened, the impulse grew within
America to insulate the natiorr from any possibility of being
drawn into another foreign war. The push for neutrality re-
vision was being transformed into a drive to establish a
rigid program of isolation.
Therefore, with agrcem8nt reached upon the necessity
for neutrality revision, there remained the question of
what form a new policy should take. Congressional opinion
favored an impartial arms embargo to be imposed by the Presi-
dent when he recoanized that a state of war existed between
b
two countries, President Roosevelt approved an embargo but
preferred that it be of a discretionary nature allowing him
to name the aggressor nation. A bill was prepared by the
State Department and introduced in Congress embodying the
views of the President. This measure was opposed by the
':.'i'r
'j!
growing bloc of Congressmen and Senators who inclined to-
ward an isolationist position, The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, chaired by Key Pittman of Nevada, introduced the
bill which was finally passed by Congress. The Neutrality
Act of 1935 required the President, in the event of a for-
progress. American vessels were prohibited from carrying such
eign war, to proclaim its existence and to withhold the ship-
ment of arms to or for all bclLi.gcr cn t.s. This mandatory em-
bargo feature did allow the President discretion in defininn-- _- b
arms, ammunition, and implements of war and in applying the
embargo to other states when they entered a w ar aLr cady In
embargoed goods [or the warrirg nations, and the President was
17
authorized to warn American citizens that they could travel
on belligerent ships only at their own risk. Also provided
for was the creation of a National Munitions Control Board,
headed by the Secretary of State, to license and supervise
all arms shipments. President Roosevelt signed the neutrality
2act on August 31, 1935.
The 1935 act did not resolve the neutrality debate
because the vital arms embargo feature was due to expire
February 29, 1936.3 Thus congressional attention assuredly
would be directed again to this issue. The focal po i n t of
the debate during the Second Session of the 74th Congress
was the question of restricting trade in materials other than
arms. A drastic measure supported by only a few extreme
isolationists was introduced by Representative Louis Ludlow,
Democrat of Indianapolis, which would have placed an absolute
embargo on all trade with bel1igerents.4 More moderate mea-
sures were proposed by both the Administration and the neu-
trality bloc in the Congress, which worked frantically to
enact new legislation by the time the 1935 act was to ex-
p i r e . Pas sed and signed by the President was an extension
of the original 1<IIY for fourteen months whi ch stiffened the
embargo provisions. While the first law had merely iwtIlOr-
iz cd tho President to extend the embargo wh cn an existing
war spread, the new law required him to do so. j\lso included
--------------
2Ib:id. , p. 117.
----
3Tbicl. , p. 134.--
4Tbicl. , p. 139.--
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was a prohibition on loans to belligerent powers made through
purchase of their securities or in any other way, long a goal
of neutrality enthusiasts. The primary debate of the session
was resolved in a manner that further curtailed the President's
freedom in the conduct of foreign policy in the event of war
abroad by denying him authority to restrict trade in raw
materials.
This problem of trade with belligerent nations was
treated in the first permanent neutrality legislation, whicll
was enacted just as the previ.ous act expired. Pnssed on I\pril
30, 1937, and signed into Law the f o Liow i.n g day , the Third
Neutrality Act extended indefinitely the arms embargo and
5the prohibition against loans. Included were two new fea-
tures. Instoad of merely discouraging travel of Americans
on belligerent ships the new law forbade such activity. Fur-
ther, for a period of two years the President was permitted
to allow the export of certain non-military goods to belligey-
ents if those commodities wero paid for in cash and carried
away ln foreign ships. This cash and carry provision
was never put into effect as it expired before the outbreak
of general war.
Also occurring during these years and important III this
sttldy because of the prominent position in the effort occupied
by Tndian:l Congressman Ludlow was the movement to adopt :l COll-
stitutional amendment requiring any declaration of war by the
5Alexander DeCon(~e,. A..-J.!.!st~of American I,'oreig n Po] j-
c)' (New York: Charles Scnlmer's Sons, 19cJ:q, p. 5Ci9. -~------.---
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United States to be subjected to a national referendum.
Ludlow had long supported this concept, mentioning it ln his
autobiography published in 1924. Such a proposal was first
introduced in 1917 by Senator Thomas Gore of Oklahoma and
similar proposals were made in every subsequent Congress ex-
cept the Sixty-sixth. All such resolutions were referred to
the appropriate .jud i c iary sub-committee and remained buried
there. However, in 1935 Representative Ludlow, who was to
become the most persistent and energetic advocate the war
referendum movement gained, introduced yet another such pro-
posal. He actively sought support for his measure both In
the Congress and among organizations in the peace movement.
Although he received the enthusiastic support of most iso-
lationists, his amendment proposal again died in committee
. 6at the end of the seSSIon.
At the beginning of the next Congress in 1937 Ludlow
reintroduced his resolution. At this same time, Ludlow pub-
lished Hell or Heaven, a book written
to show that America is sitting on a powder
keu' that it is without any adequate safe-
gu~;ds against war;.that.its peace an~ se~ur-
ity are constantly Im~erllled br selfl~h.ln-
terests lured by profIts; that Its posltlon
in a world of strife is extremely precari-
ous ancI that it's likely at any time to be
dragged into another foreign conflict.7
In this book Ludlow presented the case for his war rc fc rcri-
6P.Ianfred Jonas, Isolationism in Allleri~193S-19111
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 15~---·--
7Louis L. Ludlow, HelloI' Heaven (Boston: The Strat-
ford Company, 1937), p. ii.
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dum amendment and made a plea for support. When the House
Judiciary Committee failed to report out his resolution, Ludlow
introduced a new resolution to bring the amendment proposal
directly to the floor as a special order of business. However ,
the new resolution was referred to the Rules Committee which
took no further action, Ludlow's diligence eventually resulted
in the obtaining of sufficient signatures to discharge his
resolution from Committee and allowed him to move that his war
referendum proposal be brought to the floor. His motion was
defeated by only a 188 to 209 vote margin, another indication
of the strength of isolationist sentiment within the Congress.
8
Meanwhile, the seemingly inexorable march of events dur-
lng 1938 including Hitler's Austrian coup, the Munich confer-
ence, and increasing Japanese activity in the Pacific, led the
President to conclude that the foreign policy of the United
States should be re-evaluated. In his annual message to the
Congress given in January, 1939, he expressed his dissatis-
faction with existing neutrality legislation and declared that
such laws often operated to permit aid to aggressor nations
and deny it to the victims of aggression. With the cash and
carry provision of the current law due to expire May 1, and
the President's obvious wish for neutrality revisi.on, the 76tll
Congress faced the most complex and involved discussion of the
issue yet to be held.
Fearing those who had opposed his domestic programs
8Jonas, Isolationism, p. 162.
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would be equally intransigent toward any foreign policy closely
identified with him, President Roosevelt agreed to allow Sena-
tor Key Pittman and his Foreign Relations Committee take charge
of revision of the existing neutrality legislation. Although
Pittman announced in January that his comm i ttee would hold
hearings to discuss the neutrality issue, no action came until
after the German seizure of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939.
Senator Pittman met with State Department officials and
drafted a comprehensive neutrality bill embodying the basic
position the Department had been urging since the previous
winter. The bill privided for repeal of the arms embargo and
adoption of cash and carry for all trade with belligerents.
It forbade any American ship to enter a belligerent port and
required American citizens to transfer title to all exports
to nations at war before the goods left the United States.
In addition, the Pittman Bill continued the other provisions
of the 1937 act. Two changes were written in, requiring the
President to put the law into effect within thirty days after
the outbreak of either a declared or undeclared war and pivinClo . b
him the discretionary authority to proclaim cornb at. zones from
wh i ch he could ban all American ships and t ravc lors , even if
they were enroute to a neutral port,9
Congressional reaction to the Pittman Bill wn s indica-
tive of the ensuing struggle which consumed the next tllree
years. Formal consideration of the neutrality J.ssue began
9F .O. Ivi1cox, ''Neu t rali ty Fig 11tin Con gres 5 : 19:;~),"
Am eric an Pol itic a1 Sci en cc T\ evic w , XLV IT (. J U 11c , J 95:;), 8 I.).
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April 5, 1939, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
opened public hearings on the various proposals to revise
the 1937 act,lO The comnittee hearings continued through
the first week in Mav and heard testimony from representa~,
tives of pacifist groupS, veterans organizations, labor
unions, women's clubs, and ethnic societies, in addition
to such distinguished witnesses as the former Secretary of
State, Henry Stimson, and Bernard Baruch. Frederick Van
Nuys, the senior senator from Indiana and a Democrat, was
the only member of the Foreign Relations Committee who
failed to attend even one of the hearings, thus preclud-
Ing an expression of his views which would have been pro-
. 1 1 I ., d' tIl' 11VlC ec lad he pa.rtlclpate r.n ie neari ng s ,:
When r.n mid-May Senator Pi t tman announced he wa s
planning to postpone any further consideration of neu-
trality revision for several weeks, the Administration de-
cided to move the fight into the I~use of Representatives
under the direction of Representative Solomon Bloom of
New York who was chairman of the foreign Affairs Committee.
Although Bloom was judged by the Administration to be no
more competent and forceful a leader than Pittman, he intro-
duced a new neutrality resolution on May 29 which embodied
lOIhvine, Illusion, p. 246.
llIIearings be foro the Senate Foreign Ro La tio ns Com-
mittee, Neutrallty~ Pence Legislation, and Our Foreign
Po 1icy, 76th Congre-:'s"s,-r'st Se ssion (Washington, n. C:. :
U.S. Government ~rinting Office, 1~39).
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the program Cordell Hull had forn.ulatecl.12 The Bloom Bill. . ,
as reported out of the Foreign Affairs Committee, on which
no members of the Indiana delegation served, had undergone
Slight modification but still proposed significant changes
in the existing neutrality act. It repealed the arms em-
bargo, granted the President discretion to invoke the act
only when necessary to promote the security and preserve
the peace of the United States, allowed the President to
decide when to apply the transfer of title provisions as
well as to select the types of ex~orts to be covered by
this Clause, and authorized the President to desir;nate
combat zones which would be closed to both American ships
and travelers.13
Debate on the Bloom Bill began on the floor of the
Ilouse on June 27, 1939.14 Representative Ludlow of Indiana-
polis was one of the leaders of the group of Democrats
firmly opposed to any changes in the 1937 act. Ludlow, who
had once again introduced his resclution calling for a war
referendum amendment to the Constitution, labelled the Bloom
Bill one of the most dangerous brought before the Congress
during his tenure there. He contended the bill would push
America into world power politics, making it easy to get
into war and difficult, if not impossible, to stay out of
war. The cash and carry provisions, according to Lud 1011[ ,
12nivine, Illusion, pp. 262-266.
13T • • 1rhlcox, "Ne ut raLi t y Flglt," 818.
l4Tbicl., 821.
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would convert America into an arsenal, storehouse, and source
of supply for Great Britain because in any war Britain and
France wouLd control the seas, Voicing the revisionist line
developed by the Nye Committee, the Indianapolis Congressman
mentioned the lure of war profits and prophesied that a
lucrative war trade would be built up. Ile questioned whether
a professedly Christian people were willing to furnisll imple-
ments of war and declared,
If we are going to furnish war-mad nations with
implements for killing and torturing human beings
by-wholesale we had better burn our Bibles and
our churches and confess that we have no love
left in our hearts for the living God.IS
Representative Gillie of Fort Wayne spoke the next
clay. Although he expressed his agreement with Ludlow, he
made a less emotional though equally vehement statement.
Gillie saw the critical situation facing Great Britain and
France as completely outside the national interests of tile
United States. He defined neutrality in terms of an absolute
refusal to give any support to either side in a foreign war
and advo cate d a policy forbidding exports of aII kinds and
loans and credits to all belligerents upon outbreak of wn r.
Congressman Gillie added that a "pr cpondcr-ant majority" 01'
his constituents had made known to him their confjc1ence that
such a program wouLd do moro than any other neutrality bill
to keep the United States out of war and entanglement ,16 llow-
ISCongressional Record, 76th Congress, 1st Session
(.June 27,-1939], 8017.
16Ibid. (June 28,1939), 8177.
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ever, he did not explain the specific manner in which these
views had been conveyed to him.
This feeling that avoidance of war was paramount to
all other considerations was also shared by Republican Cong -
ressman Charles A. IIalleck of Indiana's Second District. On
May 1, IIalleck had stated that nothing was more important
at that time than keeping the United States out of war.
Furthermore, llIf we're involved in another war it will mean
the end of democracy in this land. It will mean the estab-
17
lishJTlent of a Fascist regime of government."
Another staunch and vocal supporter of strict Ileu-
trality was Republican Raymond Springer who thought that
the formulation of foreign policy should remain vested In Ii"I',.
• 'I
. jthe representatives of the people rather than be given up
to the executive branch. He expressed his f a i th in an ern- ,.
bargo against the transportation of arms, munitions, and
war supplies as the secure way of maintaining neutrality.
Springer suggested that the United States should abstain
from committing any overt act which might possibly involve
18the nation in the foreign war ,
Although no other members of the Indiana delegation
spoke out on the Bloom Bi 11, three ro 11 c a 11 votes t al.cn
on the bill provide fl clear indication of wh cro they stood.
Perhaps most illustrative of attitude is the vote OIl the
17Ibid.
18Ibicl.
(Ma y 1, 1939), 4957.
(Jun e 29, 1939), 8249 .
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Vorys Amendment. Representative John Vorysl a Republican
from another Mid-Western state, Ohio, offered the crucial
amendment which was to virtually nullify the Administration's
revision program that session. He proposed the enactment of
a limited embargo covering arms and ammunition but excluding
implements of wa r , Vorys argued that since the latter cate-
gory included items such as aircraft that Here also used for'
peace ful purpo ses his propos aI was a reasonab I e comp r-om i s e .19
The Vorys Amendment was accepted by a 214 to 173 vote.
Only two from Indiana, both DelTlocrats,opposed this effort to
cripple neutrality revision. Eugene Crowe and Dr. William
Larrabeo voted with the minority favoring repeal of the arJlls
embargo, with William Boehne recorded as not voting. The en-
tire Republican contingent from Indiana favored this measure
and was joined by the staunch advocate of mandatory neu-
trality, Democrat Ludlow. Also voting with the majority
was Democrat William Schulte of Lake County.20
Schul t e opposed only the ar-m s embargo repeal and not
the other sections of the bill and joined Crowe and Larrabee
to oppose recommital of the bill to committee whicll lvas an
attempt to kill any chance of revision that session.21 The
vote on final passage supports the conclusion that SClllll tc
was not firmly opposed to all neutrality revision as he
lOr)" ' .,Lvlnc, IllUSIon, p. 272.
20c, .. '1.ongreS 5 Lona.!_. _I_(c_'c_o_r_((June .30, 19:)9), 8511.
71 b i 1~ ~., 8512.
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again joined Crowe and Larrabee to vote with the majority
to pass the Bloom Bill, 201 to 196.22 With Representative
Boehne again recorded as not voting, the remainder of the
Indiana delegation chose to oppose even the emasculated at-
tempt to revise foreign policy which the amended Bloom Bill
would provide.
Attention next shifted to the Senate where Pittman
had deferred meeting his committee until the House acted~
Finally on July 11, the Foreign Relations Committee met
and quickly accepted a motion to postpone any further con-
sideration of neutrality revision until tho next session of
Congress in 1940. The vote was twelve to ten on the motion
witll Senator Van NUys voting with the isolationist majority,
Because he neither attended the public hearings of the com-
mittee nor spoke out on the floor of the Senate, it is dif-
ficult to learn Van Nuys~ views. However, in Robert Divine's
account of the subject, for which he had access to vast rep
sources, the Indiana Senator is not mentioned as one of the
equivocating members of the Foreign Relations Committee but
rather is included among the isolationists.
23
With the vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee to postpone action on the Pittman Bill, the chance
ended for neutrality revision during the First Session of
the 76th Congress. Those who opposed the involvement of
22rbid" 8513,.-.--.---
23Divine, Illusion, P, 279.
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America in the critical situation in Europe succeeded at
least temporarily in their attempt to prevent repeal of the
arms embargo. The Indiana delegati8n almost in its entirety
was a significant part of that grOU?
th ,-, d d 24e Longrcss a journe .
On August 5, 1939,
""i:
, "
24 Ib' 1 287_',_~., p. ,~.
CHAPTER TWO
NEUTRALITY REVISION ACHIEVED
SPECIAL SESSION
The long-developj,ng European crisis finally cul-
minated in world war on September 3, 1939, following
the march of the German Army into Poland two days earl-
ier.I When the formal declaration of war against Germany
was issued by Great Britain and France, President Roose-
velt invoked the Neutrality Act of 1937, which applied
the arms embargo to all belligerents. Howe ver , he soon
announced that he would call Congress into special ses-
sion on September 21 for the express purpose of repealing
the arms embargo.2 Indiana Democratic Senator Sherman
Minton at t ende d a meeting with the President and several
other Congressional leaders on the day before the new
session began and was one of those entrusted with steer-
Ing repeal of the arms embargo through the Senate.
In order to avoid the legislative delay that would
face a new bill, the Administration chose to use the Bloonl
Hill which had already passed the House as the vehicle for
neutrality revision. The Senate Foreign Re lat ions Connnitt oo
IDivine, Illusion, p. 286.
2Ibid., p. 292.
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would draft a substitute and, following Senate action on
this substitute, the House could agree to the new legisla-
tion simply by instructing its conferees to agree to the
Senate version. The new measure was reported out of the
Foreign Relations Committee on September 28. While Senator
Van Nuys had voted in June to postpone neutrality revision,
this time he voted to report the measure out of Committee
rather than with those who still voted against sending the
bill to the floor to try to block embargo repeal.3 The
chief features of the bill approved by the Committee were
repeal of the arms embargo and a sWBeping application of
the cash and carry formula. All American exports to
belligerent ports would have to be carried in foreign Sllips
with transfer of title taking place before the goods left
the United States. The President was given authority to ban
the entry of American ships, aircraft, or citizens into any
area which he designated as a combat zone. In addition, the
bill continued the ban on loans and on American travel on
belligerent ships as well as forbade the arming of American
merchant vessels.4
On October 2, the Senate began the debate on the
bill which was to continue for four weeks.S Administration
spokesmen, following the advice of Vice-President John Nance
Garner, allowed the isolationists to dominate the debate.
3Ibid, , p. 313.
4Ibid, , p. 314.
SIbid. , p. 31S.
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However, Sherman Minton? who was the Senate Democratic
whip, sometimes replied to the charges made by opponents
of embargo repeal. He joined Democratic Senator Tom
Connally of Texas in attacking the isolationistst conten-
tion that the export of arms had caused American involve-
men t in the World War. J'i!intonasserted, "Never in the
history of our country or of any other country did the
sale of mun i tions ever drag a country into war. ,.,6
Senator Minton responded to the charges of Repub-
lican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Massachusetts, that
the effects of repeal would actually be the creation of
a state of unneutrality in favor of France and Great Bri-
tain. Minton did admit repeal would help Britain and
France but held that the advantage stemmed from the fact
that the two countries had better navies than their adver-
sary. Thus, their advantageous position would not exist
because of any favor the United States had granted them.7
In spite of such intricate reasoning, Senator Minton's
desire to see Great Britain aided was not obfuscated.
On October 24, consideration of amendments to the
bill began.S For the next three days a series of rcstrictft
ive amendments were offered by the isolationists, all of
which were voted down. Both Senator JlUnton and Sen.a t or
r 6Congressional Record, 76th Congress, 2nd Session
(October 16, 1939), 745.
7Ibid. (October 14, 1939), 435.
8Divine, Illusion, p. 324.
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Van Nuys voted with the majority to defeat these efforts.9
The only clue to the shift in position of Senator Van Nuys
from Juae, when he had voted to postpone neutrality re-
vision, was a statement he made while participating in a
discussion of the issue on a radio program which was re~
printed in the Record. He stated that he wanted the Ameri~
can public aware that no one willing to pass the Pittman
Bill wanted America involved in the war. Rather, the ques-
tion was how best to accomplish a stop to the spread of
Hitlerism.lO After voting down three amendments which would
have restored the arms embargo, on October 27, hy a vote of
63 to 30, the Senate passed the revised Bloom Bill, with
both Indiana Senators voting yea.ll
rhe House of Representatives then accepted a motion
from its Rules Committee to disagree with the Senate amend-
ments to the Bloom Bill and called for a conference. De-
bate in the House centered on whether or not to instruct
the conferees to insist on any amendments to the bill as
passed by the Senate.
Indiana Representatives from both political parties
took part in the discussion of the proposed neutrality re-
Democrat Eugene Crowe of the Ninth Indiana Congres-vision.
sional District, while affirming his opposition to American
9Congre ssional Recor_d (October 24-26~
1939) , 794,
800 841,,
10Ibicl. (October 11, 1939) , App.
243.
llIbicl. (October 27, 1939) , 916,
986, 1023, 1024.
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entry into any· foreiQn war. declared that the bestv ' way to
keep the United States out of war would be to keep American
ships out of combat zones and away from belligerent ports,
He offered his support for the cash and carry provisions of
the neutrality proposal then under consideration,12 Repre-
sentative Crowe was the only member of the Indiana dele~a-'-'
tion to speak out in favor of the proposed legislation,
Louis Ludlow, one of the leaders of the House Demo~
Crats opposing the Administration's program, delivered a
defense of their position. HIn this country of ours we
have two ideologies in respect to war," he began.
Those ideologies have come to a clashing point
and a chDice must be made. If we adopt as our
permanent policy one ideo!ogy, sometimes con-
temptuously called isolatlon but which is not
isolationist at all, we may safely count on re-
maining at peace with the world.
On the other hand, he continued, adoption of the inter~
ventionist ideology would make it simply a question of
time before America was dragged into war. Ludlow ex-
plained the isolationist ideology as one which
does not suggest or even intimate that America
should isolate itself from ~he world. It mere-
ly suggests that we should lsolate ourselves
from the wars that eternally are brewing in
the cockpit of European~ in other foreign
trouble areas of the glooe.
An embargo levied on all goods to belligerents was sug-
gested by Congressman Ludlow as a true neutrality policy.13
12"[l'1" )lC , (October 25,1939), App. 502.
(October 16, 1939), 485.13Ibid.~
34
Representatives Halleck, Republican from Rensselaer,
and Sprino-erb , Republican from Muncie, made short speeches
VOicing their opposition to repeal of the arms embargo. A.
more impas sioned speech was del iverecl by a first-term Re ~
publican from South Bend, George Grant, who proclaimed,
Every impulse of patriotism and every consid-
eration of real Americanism impels me to vote
against repeal of the embargo on arms, ammuni-
tion, and implements of war.14
His speech assigned the outbreak of war in Europe to a cul-
mination of age
r
o1cl hatreds, class conflicts, religious an-
tagonisms, and boundary disputes. Grant called Europe a
seething cauldron of diplomatic intrigues and real estate
If we maintain peace, we will continue to hold
aloft the beacon light of freedom for all humanity.,,15
aggressions.
Reiterating the same theme, Representative Gerald
Landis, Republican from the Seventh District, in a speech
on the floor of the House during debate on repeal of the
arms embargo said, lINow that Europe is back again at its
IIOO-year-old job of war, the primary job of the U,S. is
to keep out of vrar,1,16 In stating that those who opposed
the changes in the neutrality law were not isolationists
but were simply against becoming entangled in war, Landj.s
stressed that the conflict was an internal European one and
essentially foreign to the concerns of the United States.
------~------------l4Ibid. (November 1, 1939), 1219.
15Ibid., 1220.--l6Ibicl., 1225.--
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He gave his support to a cash and carry program for all non-
military supplies and to retention of the arms embargo.
Representative Gillie incormed the Congress on
November 1 that during the prev~ous five weeks he had re-
ceived correspondence from nearly 15,000 citizens of the
Fourth District who almost unanimously called for retention
of the arms embargo. Charging that opponents of the embargo
had tried to cloud the issue by saying that cash and carry
and the embargo were incompatible, Gillie expressed his
approval of a cash and carry program for all general supplies
without repeal of the embargo on arms.l?
Representative James Shanley, a Connecticut Democrat,
moved to instruct the Bouse conferees to insist on the re-
tention of the embargo when they met in conference committee.
Before voting on the Shanley mo t icn 1 the IIouse considered a
compromise proposal by Ohio Representative Vorys to amend
the Shanley motion to instruct the conferees to i.nsist on a
1imi ted crnbarco which would forbid the sale 0 f arms and am-
c>
munition but permit the export of implements of war. This
motion was identical to the amendment which Vorys had suc-
ceeclecl in attaching to the Bloom Bill the previous spring.
Ilowe vo r , this time the IIouse rejected the limited crnb ar go ,
Con gre ssmari Ludlow joined the Republ Lcan mo mb er s From In d i .m a
in voting in favor of keeping an embargo on arms and Clmllluni-
l7Ibid. 1220.
36
tion.18 Next, the House voted down the more stringent
Shanley proposal, and again only the Indiana Democratic
Congressmen Boehne, Crowe, and SeLulte opposed retention
of the embargo. Republicans C;i1lie, Grant, Halleck, Harness ,
Johnson, Landis, and Springer, joined by the vocal anti~inter-
ventionist Democrat Ludlow favored the Shanley motion.19
On the next morning, the conference committee met,
and the House conferees accepted the revised bill as amended
by the Senate. Both Houses quickly accepted the conference
report that same day, November 3, 1939, with a final vote
of 243 to 172 in the House and 55 to 24 in the Senate.
20
The vote of the Indiana members was predictable. Boehne,
Crowe, Larrabee and Schulte in the House and Senators,
Minton and Van Nuys voted to agree to the conference report.
Thus, neutrality revision was achieved with a majority of
the Indiana delegation opposing such a program. In essence ,
the new legislation made only two vital changes in American
neutrality policy. With the signing of the act, Americans
could ship arms, ammunition, and implements of war to bel-
ligerents, but all trade with nations at war in Europe had
to be conducted in foreign ships, with transfer of title to
cargoes taking place before the goods left the United States.
The restrictions on loans and passenger travel in the 1937
18Ibid. (November 2, 1939), 1343.
19Ibid" 1344 ..-,,----.-.
20Ibicl.CNovember 3,1939),1389,1356.~-
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act were continued under the new legislation. American
ships could not enter war zones as proclaimed by the Presi~
dent even if destined for a neutral port.21
CHAPTER T[IREE
PASSAGE OF PEACETI~G CONSCRIPTION
76TIl CONGRESS, 3RD SESSION
Following the lull in the war during the winter of
1939-1940, events in Europe onCE again reached the critical
stage when spring came. Hitler launched the great western
offensive which culminated with the fall of France. His
armies Occupied Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxemhourg during April and May.l
In the llilitedStates public opinion had shifted suffi-
ciently to permit Congress to pass programs with little op-
position providing for rearmament and military preparedness.
However, when the question of peacetime conscription wa s
raised, Controversy surrounded it and once again the isola-
tionists were given an issue. America had never conscripted
men for military service in time of peace, and the idea of
compulsory service was repugnant. But at this time, the reg-
ular army wa s limited by Law to 375,000 men, with its actual
strength including tho National Guard at not marc than 11a]£
a million, Such a force was obviQus1y :inadequate to cope
with an invasion. Consequently, the Burke=Wadsworth Selective
1,])cCondc, American Foreign Policy, p. 584.
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Service Dill was introduced l"nC J- 21 1940 2. ongress on ..une , - .
By the time debate in Cengress began on August 9, a
state-by-state survey taken by Ceorgc CallupTs American In-
stitutc of Public Opinion showed every state In favor of peace-
time conscription, with the closest division of opinion in
Indiana wlre re only 55 % supported the measure. 3 Hov.rever, in
spite of public opinion in favor of conscription and the en-
dorsement of Republican presidential candidate Wendell Wilkie,
the Indiana clelegation exhibited reluctance to support the
measure. Iiv en Sena to r Min ton, vho was a memb er 0 f the :\Ii 1 .i -
tary Affairs Committee and Democratic whip, remained, for the
most part) silent on the issue. His comments eluring the ele-
hate in the Senate were primarily of an informational n a t u re
and were not expressions of his opinion of the bill, although
, I" 1 d 1 . the DJre-ne (le support the Presient's goal of strengtIenlng
paredness of the Uni ted States. Earlier in the summer, i\linton
had assailed the efficacy of an isolationist foreign policy In
I . 1 c t '.1 f -" } 1 1 The Indi anaan excIange WltI oena or ~ye 0 .~ort1 Ja~ota.
Democrat defended the President as a "patriotic high-mindel!
public servant" with no purpose of leading the nntion into
war. rEnton cleclarecl his respect for those Hllo sincerely
held isolationist views but added tha t isolationism had not
recently led to peace. Pointing out that 11011anc1, BelgiuJl1,
21Villiam L. Langer and S. Everett (;Leason, Jl1e_~hal-
Le n ge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (NCIV York: lInrper ilTl(lBrothcc-;,
1952) , p. 6 lfO".
3Evansvillc Press, August IJ, 1940, p. 8.
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Denmark, Norway, and Luxembourg had been isolationist,
Minton reminded Nye that those states had been invaded and
crushed. "No, Mr. President,l! he continued, !!isolationism
does not lead to peace, The world toda)Tknows the sad 1. es~
son that isolationism leads to war, total war.:v
4
Representative Landis appended a statement to the
Record on August 12 explaining his opposition to peacetime
The former Army lieutenant called such actionConscription.
"f.-oreign to the fundamental principles of democracy and the
American way of life.lIS Only after it 'vasproven that vol-
untary enlistments had not provided sufficient numbers for
an adequate defense was there justification for the passage
of the Burke-Wadsworth Bill according to Landis.
Indiana's Representatives had been so taciturn re-
garding their views on peacetime conscription that on the
day Burke-Wadsworth passed the House the Muncie Evening
Pr~ reported that only Representa tive Crowe favored the
bill.6 Actually, votes on the amendments and the bill it-
self reveal support from others for the bill or at least
Some of its provisions.
The Senate acted before the House and ended debate
Before the vote on passage of the bill
on August 28, 1940.
4Congressional Record, 76th Congress, 3rd Session
(,June 2].~940l~
5Ibid. (August 12, 1940), App. 4932.
6Muncie Evening Pres~, September 7, 1940, p. 4.
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was taken, two amendments were offered to postpone the
enactment of the bill until after voluntary enlistments had
been given an opportunity to provide adequate numbers. Both
amendments were voted down with Senator Van Nuys supporting
postponement and Senator Minton opposing it.7 The bill passed
58 to 31, including Senator Minton in the majority and Senator
Van Nuys in the minority. As passed by the Senate, the bill
authorized the President to select for training and induction
for service such numbers of men as were required in the na~
tional interest whether or not a state of war existed. A
national interest and for conscientious objectors was included.8
system of deferments for those engaged in occupations in the
Advocates of a trial period for voluntary enlistments
Were able to attach an amendment in the House to the con-
scription bill. The Fish Amendment, sponsored by Republican
Hamilton Fish of New York, provided for postponement of reg-
istration of men for sixty days and gained the support of
eleven of the twelve Indiana Congressmen.9 Only Representa-
tive Larrabee opposed postponement of registration. On
final passage of the bill, Eugene Crowe, as predicted by the
Muncie newspaper, did vote in favor of the establishment of
a system of selective service. Represenative Larrabee was
the only other member of the Indiana delegation to vote with
the majority which passed the bill by a vote margin of 263
7Congressional Reco~ (August 28,1940), 11124-11125.
8~., 11142.
9Ibid. (September 7, 1940), 11748.
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to 149.10
The ~Iouse of Representatives requested a conference
to reconcile the two bills. The major differences between
the House and Senate versions wer e the House amendment pro-
vicling for a sixty-day delay in conscription pending further
trial of VOluntary enlistments and the expanded age bracket
for registration passed by the House of twenty-one years
to forty-four years instead of twenty-one years to thirty-
one years as set by the Senate. Senator Bennett C. Clark
of Missouri, one of the most ardent isolationists in Congress,
moved to instruct the conferees to disagree to the change in
the age bracket for registration and to agree to the Fish
Amendment providing for postponement of registration for
sixty days. Both instructions were votsd down. Senator
I
!~,~
f,
""j:
Minton voted with the majority which favored the immediate
implementation of a Selective Service System, wllile Senator
Van Nuys voted to postpone enactment.ll
The conference report incorporated a compromise age
bracket for registration and provided for the immediate
establishment of a Selective Servjce System. The vote OIl
agreement to the conference report taken on September 14,
1940, showed only [our members, Senator Hinton and Repre-
sentatives Crowe, Larrabee, and Schulte, of the fourteen
member Indiana delegation were willing :0 vote Hith the
lOU " '1~.,
lIn'i~.
11754.
(September 9, 1940), 11792.
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majority to conscript men eluring peacetime to strengthen
the standing army of the United States.12
12 .Ibid. (September 141 1940), 12227.
CHAPTEE }'OUR
THE ELECTION OF 1940
The election of 1940 marks the end of a period of
Democratic control in the state of Indiana. In that elec-
tion all twelve of Indiana's U.S. Representatives and one
U,S. Senator, Sherman Minton, asked the voters of the state
to return them to Congress. An analysis of the campaigns
reveals what the candidates said or (equally important)
What they did not say in order to gain re~election. Al-
though newspaper coverage of the congressional campaigns
was not extensive, a district by district examination of
articles during the fall of 1940 gives an indication of
the foreign policy posture of the Congressmen at that time
as well as an indication of the relative importance of for-
eign and domestic issues to the voters.
Most attention, of course, centered on the presi-
den t ia 1 camp a ign, not only because Frankl in Rooseve 1t was
running for a third term but also because the Republican
nominee Wendell Wilkie was a na:ive of Indiana. Wilkie dld
not have the isolationist convictions of many Rep ubLicnns
in Congress and early in the canpaign endorsed Roosevelt's
general foreign policy goals, criticizing only the mC:U1S
the President employed. Consequently, foreign poljcy was
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neutralized as the major presidential campaign issue with
both men making sweeping promises to keep America out of the
war if elected. Wilkie attacked the ~ew Deal and Roosevelt
defended the success of his domestic ?rogram. Perhaps partly
because of this nature of the presidential campaign, the
congressional races did not provoke sharp differences in
opinion on external affairs.
Of the state campaigns the most widely covered was
that for the senatorial scat held by Sherman Minton, the
Senate Democratic whip and a staunch defender of President
Roosevelt. Minton1s Republican opponent, Angola newspaper
publisher Raymond Willis, having run a close contest for
the Senate two years earlier against Senator Van Nuys, was
a formidable candida.te. Willis had tLe advantage of having,
already participated in a state-wide campaign and was not
unkno1im to the voters. Another significant factor was the
decision of the State Election Boarel to attach the sena-
torial candidates to the national rather than the state
ticket on the paper ballots. The coupling of senatorial
and presidential candidates was vie1'Tedas an advantage for
1Villis as he would appear with the Incl.ian a+bo rn Wilkie.}
Further, Minton1s close identification wi.t h the President
and the New Deal was a liability in his horne state, which
was becoming disenchanted with the New Deal as evidenced
by an editorial, typical of lHany which appeared du rin r; the
the campaign.
lC;ary post-Tribune, September 6,1940, n. 4.
46
Senator Minton, who has boasted that he is a New
Deal rubber stamp, is probably the most easily
controlled Senator in Congress. His record has
been one of unvarying submission to White 1I0use
orders, and he has at times subordinated the
interests of his constituents to the wishes of
the New Deal administration at Washington. I1is
defeat should be a certainty.2
With anti-Roosevelt sentiment growing in Indiana,
Willis quite naturally devoted much of his campaign to
attacks upon the Democratic incumbent's support of the
New Deal. Th e Indiana Republican Editorial Association lent
their substantial support to the Angola pUDlisher, one of their own
rnember-s., who wa oed ancO
intensive campaign from mid-September until election day.
Senator Minton, on the other hand, was not able to
open his campaign until October 2, on which evening he spoke
at Sullivan upholding his allegiance to the President and
the New Deal.3 Newspaper accounts of the speeches of the
two candidates indicate Minton concentrated more on the
foreign situation than did his Republican opponent, per-
haps because he was aware his actions in the area of domestic
affairs were unpopular in Indiana. In a speech on October
15, IEnton accused the Republican party of appeasement by
opposing many Roosevelt-sponsored measures to strengthen
American defenses.4 Although he made relatively few speeches
during the campaign, Minton advocated building up the strength
2(Goshen) News-Democrat, October 30, 1940, p. 4.
3South Bend Tril)l~, October 31 1940, p. 4.
4T1 . 1 1 6 7)lC., OctoJer 1 , 1940, p. ~.
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of the United States and repeatedly assured the people that
Roosevelt was not leading them into war.
The foreign policy comments of Willis were primarily
charges that Roosevelt was using the international situation
as a smoke-screen to distract attention from his failure to
solve domestic problems. In a speech at Madison, Willis
declared III am not an isolationist., I am not now an inter-
ventionist in the true sense of the '-lord.uS Assuring the
people that although he favored arming for the protection
of the country, Willis pledged never to vote to send Ameri-
cans to fight in a European war. Newspaper coverage indi-
cates Willis concentrated on linking Minton with the Presi-
dent and then attacking the New Deal domestic policLes. The
Republican candidate discounted the foreign situation, aCr.:»
cusing Roosevelt of creating a ~ar scare to divert emphasis
fr om domestic affairs. Ili s st ateme n t s regarding the war
in Europe were of a cautious nature designed to alienate
no one anc1 avoided a concrete pesi tion. tlin t on de fended
the President and his own part 8S a pro-Administration
Senator without discussing that role and 11i5 record in de-
tail. He talkecl national defense but did not directly en-
courage greater participation of the United States in the
European war effort. Both lllenidentified themselves close!v
with their party's presidential candidate.
On election clay, Tuesday, November 5, 1940, the vote rs
5Ibid., October 3~ 1940, p. 4.
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of Indiana rejected their incumbent U.S. Senator and chose
instead the Republican candidate they had turned down two
years earlier. The vote closely paralleled that cast for
President with Wilkie winning over Roosevelt 899,248 to
875,418 and Willis over Minton 884,194 to 868,689.6 The
lack of any significant difference in foreign policy aims
enunciated by Wilkie and Roosevelt as well as the unpopu-
larity of the New Deal with Indiana voters indicate Minton's
defeat was not due in any large measure to his anti~isola~
tionist stand in Congress. Minton's support of neuttality
revision and selective service were not mentioned in any
newspaper accounts of his opponent's attacks upon him. The
obvious conclusion is that many citizens of Indiana were
disillusioned with Franklin Roosevelt and eagerly grasped
at the opportunity of electing a native of their own state
with substantial benefits to the Republican senatorial cand-
idate and to the disadvantage of the pro-Roosevelt Democratic
Senator.
Similarity exists between the plight of Senator
Minton and the other Democratic incumbent defeated in 1940.
Sixty-two-year-old Eugene Crowe had served in Congress since
the election of 1930, representing the predominantly rural
7Southeastern section of the state. The veteran congress-
man was defeated by a young Republican high school principal,
6Ibid1, November 7, 1940, p. 1.
7
0
fficial congressiona~Directory, 76th Congress, 1st
Session 1st ednion (Wasnlngton, D,C.: U.S. Government
Vrintln~ Office, 1939), p~ 31.
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Earl Wilson, in a District often called the t1solid South
Democr at ic. Ni.nth Dlost r i.c t ,n aD' t ' t 1 ° 1 C. ,1S rlC WI1C~ rowe had
ca °rrled by spectacular margins of up to 20,000 votes in
8
previous elections.
Candidate Wilson conducted a vigorous campaign and
enjoyed the support of a strong old-age pension pressure
group. He made frequent appearances throughout the five
counties which made up the District, generally speaking
out against the weaknesses of Roosevelt's domestic policies.
However, in a speech in Eton near the close of the campaign,
Wilson declared his main objective, if elected, would be
paign speeches of Congressman Crowe indicate he emphasized
!It It 9o keep America out of the War. References to the cam-
l'lttle but his wholehearted support of President Roosevelt
and the fact that he had never opposed a New Deal measure.
Crowe by a 2639 vote margin in what was considered an upset
by Indiana political writers,lO Wilson's victory was at-
tributed to a protest by the residents of the five southern
Indiana counties against the New Deal since Crowe in his
campaign had cited his record of full support of Roosevelt's
Policies as the major issue and Wilson had accepted that is-
When the votes were counted Earl Wilson had defeated
SUe and attacked those policies.
Consequently, if reports
8CColumbus) ~venin~ Republican, November 7, 1940, p. 1.
9Seymour Daily Tribun~, October 29, 1940, p. 1.
lOrColumbus) Evening Repu_Elican,November 7,1940, p. 1.
, ~
50
at the time by those considered authorities can be accepted,
Crowe's def=eat was t d t h" f 1. no ue 0 1S re-usa to espouse isola-
tionism as much as to his complete support of the domestic
programs of a President unpopular in his District,
The remaining four Democratic incumbents, none of
whom were as closely identified with Franklin Roosevelt and
the New Deal as Minton and Crowe, were re-elected. Eighth
Distr1"ct Congressman lIT' '11" n B 1 b f .1vl ran oe 1ne, mem er 0, a prom i nent
Evansville politicClI family, ran for his sixth term In Con-
He had voted Clgainst peacetime conscription of mengress.
1n September in spite of its endorsement by his hometown
The Repub1icCln cClndidate, Charles Werner, whonewspaper.
had 1 .cC run against Boehne in every e ectlon since 1934 did not
wage a vigorous campaign. Foreign affairs were not mentioned
1n any accounts of the campaign and cannot be considered to
have played a part in Boehne's 17,000 vote re-election mar-
gin over Werner.ll
D" l1strict composed of the highly incustria1ized and heavily
immigrant-populated Lake county. William Schulte, who had
represented this area since 1932, was opposed by Elliott
Belshaw, a Hammond attorney, whose first attempt to gain
public office was his 1938 candidacy against Schulte.
12
Another rematch was held in the First Congressional
llSharron E. Doerner and Wayne L. Francis, eds. Indiana
~otes: Election Returns for Unj_!ed States G_epresentative; Elec-
.!ion Returns fo~General Ass~mbly 1~22 -1?58 (Bloomington:
Bureau of Government Reseilrch, IncfHma UnIversIty, 1962),1).47.
l2Gary post-TTibun~, November 2, 1940, p. 15.
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Newspaper articles which appeared during the fall indicate
neither candidate conducted a vigoroJs campaign in Lake
County, a traditionally Democratic stronghold. Representa-
tive Schulte was re-electecl by the greatest percentage mar-
gin rece ived by any Indiana Congres sman in the elee tion, 60. 8~)
of the total vote cast in the District.13 Lake County also
voted to elect President Roosevelt and Senator Minton in con-
trast to the preference indicated by the state as a whole.
In the 11th District re-election was less assured
for seventy-year-old Democratic Representative William
Larrabee who was seeking his sixth term. In the judgment
of one newspaper from outside the District, the Republicans
offered an
unusually capable congressional nominee in Maurice
(Reel) Robison, a young Anderson lawyer. . Rob i.>
son is without doubt the ablest orator the party
has seen since the days of the immortal Beveridpe,
the campaign is already worrying Dr. Larrabee.l~
Composed of Hancock and Nac1ison Counties and Perry, Wnrren,
Franklin, Law renc c , and most of Center Town shi.n of Mari on
County, the Eleventh District historically voted Democratic
and Dr. Larrabee had been active in Indiana polities long
enough to be awar c 0 f that pat tern. 15
Campaign appearances by Dr. Larrabee were mentioned
rarely by the newsnapers wh i le f rcqucn t mention \·J:15 m ado 0 r
--~.-------
13Doerner and Francis, Indiana Votes, p. 47.
14Gary post-Tribune, October 12,1940, p . 11.
lSAndcrson Dai2L_ Bulletin, November G, 1~)40) p. 1.
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Robison's appearances. The young Republican attorneyls
efforts were nearly successful as he lost to Larrabee by
the smallest margin in the congressional elections. Dr.
Larrabee was returned to Washington with only 51.7% of the
votes cast.l6 As he had not been a vocal anti-isolationist
supporter of Franklin Rooseyeltts foreign policies, the
voters' disaffection with Larrabee cannot easily be tied to
his support of neutrality revision and peacetime conscription.
The fourth Democrat to be re-elected, Louis Ludlow of
Indianapolis, was the most outspoken and independent member
of his party in Congress from Indiana. Supporting President
Roosevelt's domestic program almost without deviation, Ludlow
just as consistently opposed his foreign policy.
lIeaven, Ludlow had stated,
In IIel1 or
If we could be assured that all of our Presidents
through all the years to come would be imbued wi th
the altruism and humanitarianism that motivate Prcs~
ident Roosevelt, there would be no need to worry.17
However, because of the lack of any such assurance, he had
again introduced his proposed constitutional amendment call-
ing for a national referendum on the participation of the
Un i ted States in a foreign 'val'an d continued to vehemently
champion the isolationist cause.
On October 31 he made the only speech of his campaign.
lIe declared the Atlantic seaboard was hysterical about the
situation in Europe. He stated his w ilLingncss to do an v-
16Doerner and Francis, Indiana Votes, p. 48.
17Ludlow, Hell or Ileave n , p. ]87.
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thing to defend America but pledged to vote against sending
American boys to fight foreign wars,l8 The local newspapers
made little mention of his Republican opponent, James A.
Collins, who did not campaign against Ludlow's forthrightc»
isolationism as this was the foreign policy stand of many
congressional Republicans, When Ludlow was re.,.elected,the
lndianapolis Star commented that he had led his ticket in
every election he had run.
He has never made a partisan speech in Congress
or in his district. Ludlow who did practically
no campaigning this time, arriving here from
Washington less than a week before the election,
believes his re-ele~tion expresse~ the people's
strong feelings agaLnst the war!l)
In the seven contests in which Republicans were re-
elected, the closest race occurred in the Third District
composed of Elkhart, Laporte, and St. Joseph Counties. A
Democratic landslide in St. Joseph County nearly elected
COunty attorney George Sands over the first-term incumbent
The Q_ary post-Tribune characterized Crant
Robert Grant.
as a young man who was facing an older and more seasoned
Politician in the person of Sands, a former State Senator.20
Sands spoke out against Itawar of sympathy" and said, nwc
are not concerned in the quarrels of others.,,21 Grant's
comments on the subject were much the S2me as he accused the
18Indianapolis New2_, November 1, 1940, p. 18.
19Indianapolis Sta~, November 7, 1940, p. 5.
20Gary Post_~~un~, october 12, 1940, p, 11.
21South BenelTribun~, october 31,1940, p. 7.
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President of failing to pursue a policy for peace. Their
essential differences were in the area of domestl"c policy)
as a result of Sands~ support of the economic programs of
the New Deal. Because of the size of the vote cast in his
favor in Elkhart and LaPorte Counties, Grant was able to
offset the Democratic vote in St. Joseph County and win
re-election.
Representatives Springer, Halleck, and Harness were
returned to Congress by comfortable vote margins and without
extensive campaigning. Newspaper accounts of the campaigns
indicate all three men attacked President Roosevelt and warned
against a possible dictatorship as a result of a third-term.
Springer wa s a well-known Republican who had run for Governor
in 1932 and 1936, then went to Washington following the elec-
tion of 1938. Halleck had made the nominating speech fay
Wendell Wilkie at the Republican National Convention at
Philadelphia, June 26, but had not mentioned Wilkie's for-
eign policy views which weye very similar to Roosevelt's while
IIalleck's own viewS were in direct opposition to the Presi-
dent's.22 In spite of their differences in this ayea, Halleck
played a prominent national role in the Wilkie campaign. In
the accounts appearing in Indiana newspapers, Halleck avoided
the foreign policy question and instead emphasized the domestic
policy differences between the two presidential contenders as
he had in his nominating speech.
22
C
harles A. Halleck, itAMan Big Enough to be President"
l'_i~al Speeches CJ_f_~' Volume VI, No.9, July IS, 1940, ,
p p , 586-589.
,----------------------
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Forest Harness, who was seeking his second term in
Congress, ~as able to d l'tt1 1.• , spen 1 e more tlan one week cam-
paigning in his Fifth District because he was a member of
the Military AfE" C"t h.i:alrS omm! tee Wl1Ch had a heavy schedule
of national defense legislation that fall. Nevertheless 1
he won by 13,491 votes and lost only Blackford County of
the . 23nlne comprising his District.
Congressmen Johnson and Landis had more closely con~
te s ted and intens ive ly \~aged campaigns · Noble Johnson, who
had rep . h' . dur i h 1resented the Slxt Dlstrlct lng t e ate 1920's- .'
sat t" .au four Congresses and was returned by the voters in
1938, was opposed by Lenhardt Bauer, a young Democratic
attorney and former member of the Indiana House of Repre-
Sentatives from Terre Haute. Bauer made frequent appear-
ances throughout the District and summarized the campaign
with the question,
Are we to preserve the orderly proce~~es of human
relief that have become a part of thls govern-
ment or arc we to turn in despair and confusion
to t~e misfit relati~Rs that we attempted before
President Roosevelt?
Perhaps then, the voters of the ten central Indiana counties
of the District wished to register their displeasure with the
Policies of Roosevelt as they returned Johnson to Congress.
rIVen traditionally liberal Vigo County went for Johnson who
Won with the largest majority the District had given any cand-
23 d F Cl'S Indiana Vote~, p. 47.Doerner an, ran ,_..............::..:--__ ---c
24 "b Octobe"r'16 1940 P ~)Terre Haute Tn..·uns_, ," "- "
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idate in recent years.25
The Frankl in Evsning Star reported, "old age pens ions
are definitely the number one issue in the Seventh District
Congressional contestn between the incumbent Gerald Landis
and his opponent Charles Bedwell.26 An attorney, Bedwell
was widely known throughout the District as a result of
a long political career which included a term as Speaker
of the Indiana House of Representatives. IIowever, Landis ,
supported by the Tovmsend Old Age pension Clubs I was able
to gain re~election in this usually Democratic southern
Indiana District in spite of considerable newspaper edi-
torial sentiment favoring Bedwell.
The only candidate who chose to make foreign policy
his major campaign issue was George Gillie of Fort Wayne
and the traditionally Republican Second District. Gillie
campaigned against his Democratic opponent Frank Corbett,
a Fort Wayne attorney, with the pledge never to send Amerj-
can soldiers to fight and die on European battlefields. Re-
peatedly stating that the primary issue facing the voters
was the choice between war and peace, Gillie won his second
term in Congress by a greater vote than that cast in his
District for Wendell Wilkie.27 Gillie was a popular candi-
date in a District normally dominated by his party.
November 7, 1940, p. 1.
26fEa~klin Evening Star, October 19~ 1940, p. 1.
27CFOTt Wayne) News-Sentinel, November 6, 1940, p. 1.
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Thus, of the thirteen men seeking re e eLe c t i on only
two were rejected by the voters. Both men, Sherman Hinton
and Eugene Crowe, empha sized dur :Lng the campaign the ira 11c g _
iance to President Roosevelt and their records of total sup ~
port of his programs, foreign as well as domestic. Given
the considerable disillusionment with the New Deal whicl}
prevailed in Indiana by 1940, it is not surprising that two
men so closely identified with it were defeated. Also to
be considered are the two Republican opponents. Raymond
Willis had run two years earlier and was already known to
the electorate. Earl Wilson was endorsed by a strong
pressure group in his District. All in all it would seem
'finton and Crowe we re defeated no t becaus o they had vo ted
in fa vo r 0 f neut raIit)' rev is ion wh i.ch would aI J all' the Un i ted
States to aid Great Britain or for peacetime conscriptioll.
Rather their support of Franklin D, Roosev~ltfs domestic
policies with which the people of Indiana were growing (lis_
enchanted would appear the more immediate cause of the de-
feat of Minton and Crowe.
Of the cleven incumbent members of the lIouse of Rep_
resentatives re-elected, the 1'1[1.rissue dominated the cClmjlni,~;n
of On1)T the Democratic Ludlow and the Rc nu bIican (;iLlie . '1'1
lc
absence of any campaign involving men who hele! opposing vic,vs
on the subject and who made foreign policy the principal l.s_
sue makes it difficult to determine the nature and strength
of the votersf opinions regarding international affairs.
However, precisely because there was no camp a ign in which th'l1:
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issue was clearly presented to the voters in alternative
ways, it would be reasonable to conclude that the peonle
of Indiana were primarily concerned with domestic matters.
Newspaper articles tend to corroborate this conclusion. The
election, then did not serve as a referendum on the foreign
policy attitudes of the candidates for re-election. In a
Republican year for Indiana politics, two Democratic In-
cumbents were defeated and seven Republicans were re-clectcd.
CHAPTER FIVE
LEI\JJ) ~LE/\SE, FURTHER NEUTRAL ITY REVIS TON,
C(TENSION OF SnLECTIVE SERVIC];, AND WAR
77TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION
By late 1940 the plight of Great Britain had become
qui t e perilous. Fo Ll.owi.ng the fall of France, IIit lor con ~
centrated on defeating the British in order to have the
western front under control so that he could turn to the
east and devote full attention to the Russians. It was
almost certain that Britain could never defeat Germany,
and it was doubtful whether the Bri t i.sh could wit hst and ,I
German attack for any length of time without some kind of
assistance. The destroyers for bases deal was finally
worked out to fill Britain's desperate need for ships.
lIowever, as the year ended it 'vas apparent that Gr cat
Britain llad a critical need for massively increased aiel
from the United States, but at the sallletime was in the
midst of a stead.ily worsening financial crisis which made
the situation even more severe.
At a press conference on December 17, 1940, the
President first mentioned that one of many possible mcthods
of aiding the British would be to lease needed j t cms , ]):IS i ng
such action on the grounds that defending Grcat Bri.tain was
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ln the best interests of the national security of the lhlited
1States and the American people. Public opin i.on polls taken
at this same time indicate considerable popular support had
developed for aid to Britain even at the risk of war, and
about 70% favored revising the Neutrality Act ln order to
aid the British more effectively.2
In his annual message to Congress at the beginning of
the First Session of the 77th Congress, the President elll-
phasizec1 that the fate of the United States vias linked to the
outcome of the European war, and he aske~ EoI' authority and
funds to manufacture war equipment of all kinds for opponents
of the a ggr e s s o r nations to be paid for ott the end or the war
in goods and services. The drafting of the bill which W(lS
to become the vehicle to allow Roosevelt to achieve his
stated goal began on January 2, 1941, an,J was clone by the
legal staff of the Treasury Dep ar tment; u.id er the gu i dan c e of
S 1· 3cccretary Henry !,lorgent.tau. It was not a hastily contrived
bill as it had r e s u I ted from months of c ar ef u I thought 0 f
several w i th in the Administr'ltion. The bill w as introduced
by the majority leaders in both houses .Ja nu ar y 10, 1941, a nd
was assigned the number 1I.R. 1776 in the )[ouse.4
As originally proposed on the floor of Congress, the
lWarren A, Kimball, The nost Unso:,(lid ,\ct: Lc nd v Lcn s c
.~.939-l941 (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins Press, 19(9), p. 121.
2Ibicl. 1 p, 126.--
3Ibic1. , p. 132.--
4 DeConde , American foreign Po1~_, p. S~)3.
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principal features of the Lend-Lease Bill were the aut.hor i.
zation for the President to manufacture or otherwise procure
defense articles for any country whose defense he deemed vital
to the defense of the United States and the permission for him
to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose
of any defense article to such a government, Also permitted
was the passing on of information needed for the use of any
goods transferred leaving the terms of such transfers of
goods and information completely to the discretion of the
President. Another section of the bill forbade recipients
of Lend-Lease to transfer such goods or information to an-
other country without the President1s ~ermission.
The opposition to the bill from the isolationist 1l11nor-
ity centered around the major theme that the extensive grant
of powers to the President made him a virtual dictator who
could take America into the wa r , The traditional clements
of isolationist thinking were present in the remarks made 1)1
members of the Indiana delegation regarding II.R. 1776. Early
in the clebate Congressman Ludlolv delivered an impassioned
speech against Lend-Lease. He ch ar ged that the
hill jnvolves changes of the 1110Stfundamental,
vi tal, and epochal -char::lcter in American policy
which in the public interest should be studjed
and debated before. eI:lb<.lYkingon a pol icy whi ch
has in it the possllnll_ty or aLtcr inz or even
abolishing our democratic form of go~ernment.S
Representative Gillie pointed out that, 1.11 his op i ni.o n ,
------------------
c-)Congressiona1 Record, 77th Congress, lst Session
(January 30, 1941), 422.
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the danger in the bill lay in its !1um'iarranted delegation of
vast war-making powers': to the Executive. According to its
proponents the principal purpose of the bill was to provide
aid to Great Britain which Gillie doubted could be accomplished
without the weakening of the d.efenses of the United States. l Io
voiced his conviction that passage of the bill would be another
step in the l:steady progress t owa.rd our active participation in
this 'dar.\16
Congressman Johnson called H,R. 1776 "onc of the most
important issues ever before Congress ,II and stated that he
had received much correspondence from his constituents who
were overwhelmingly opposed to passage of the bill. lIe r e~
iteratecl the objection expressed by the others that the bill
gave the President the powe r to take the Uni ted States into
war on the side of any country he chosc and to run the cntire
7
war effort without consulting Congress.
The inevi tal;LI ity of be ing dr awn into the war if
Lend-Lease passed was also the theme of Indiana Republican
Cerald Landis. He furtlwr commented that the cost of OJ
national defense program as well as an aiel program for
England wo uLd impose a heavy burden on the indi vi dual J\mer-
lcan citizen. Landis concluded his remarks lIJitha state-
ment containing the traditional isolationist doa,ma;
I believe the Administration has departed from the
-----
6Ibid. (February 5, 1941), 655.
7I1,id" 625.
..
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established foreign policy made by the founders of
our Nation and th~t it would be a grave mistake to
involve us in European wars. We can preserve Amer~
ican demo§racy by entirely keeping out of the Euro-
pean war,
Representative Springer also questioned the financial
aspects of the proposed bill and sta:eel that the people should
be made aware of what the costs wo u Ld be. He deplored the
great power the bill vested in the P-:esident and for these
reasons said he could not lenel his support to the bill.9 Per-
haps the most scathing comment came from Earl Wilson who
stated that he firmly believed the Lenel-Lease bill had as its
lliclden purpose the direct involvemen~ of the United States in
a foreign war.lO
The only member from Indiana to speak out favorably
ahou t the b ill in the House was Dr. 'ViII Lam Larrabee, the
veteran Democratic Representative f rcrn New Palestine. Ilc
saw the bill as the best means of prDtecting the interests
of the United States by providing articles of defense to
other nations already engaged in the hostilities. Rather
than an abdication of power to the President, Larrabee viewed
the bill as a means for Congress to assume its powers in an
eme rgency by eliminating the necessity for future delays by
placing authorization and responsibility of carrying out the
desires of the Congress in the hands of the Chief Executive.11
8Ibid. (February 4,1941), 563.
9 Ib i cl. CF e b r u a r y 5, 1941), 671 .
lOIbicl" 655,
11 Ib i cl. C Feb ruary 18, 1941), }'11' 11. 72:,.
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Lend~Lease faced several attempts at modification by
the few but battling isolationists still in the House. The
bill was reported out of the Foreign Affairs Committee on
J 1 . 12.ariuary 30 w it h only Acmlnistration~approved amendments.
Of the plethora of restrictive amendments proposed during
floor debate on the bill the most sweeping was that of
Hamil ton Fish of Nel'fYork. He proposed to strike out the
heart of the bill and recommit it to the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee with instructions to insert instead a provision autl1~
orizing the President to grant credits to Great Britain in
an amount not to exceed two billion dollars to be used for
purchase in the U11i ted States of defense articles. The
amendment was defeated by a vote of 263 to 160 although only
three Democratic members of the Indiana delegation opposed
it.13 Representatives Boehne~ Larrabee, and Schulte voted
against the Fish Amendment? while the entire Republican
delegation, joined by the indefatigable isolationist Lud1olif,
voted for the proposal. This same pattern was repeated
when the vote on final passage of the bill was taken. Again
only the Democrats Boehne, Schulte, and Larrabee, voted with
the majority to pasS the bill 260 to 165 on February 8, 1941.!4
Ludlow was one of only twenty-five Democrats who defected from
tho party position to vote against Lcnd-Loase,15
12Ir. 1 11d)rt)(;1 , ''lostUnsorcUd Act, p.--- 20.3.
13Convressional Record (February 81 1941), 814 .
•__ ~.7 <0. _~....---..---
l4Ibicl.• 815.
l5Kimball, Most Un~c1icl ~ctl p. 2()6.
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Senate hearings began before H,R. 1776 was passed
by the House ,. but the Foreign Relations Committee dropped
its own version and worked with the House version after
passage of the House bill, Although attempts were made to
cripple the bill, it was reported out of the Foreign Rela~
tions Committee intact on February 13 and a long floor de~
bate ensued.16 On the Senate side of Capitol Ilill, Lend-
Lease did not receive from the Indiana delegation even such
Scant vocal support as it had enjoyed in the House from Dr.
The newly-elected junior Senator Willis spokeLarrabee.
out at length against the bill. Although he favored aid
to Great Britain, Willis thought such an objective could
better be accomplished by a measure allowing a grant of
direct loans. He opposed using a means to reach the end
of aid to Britain if use of that means resulted in the in-
vo1vemen t of the United States in w ar . Up ho j ding the tracli-
tional isolationist doctrine, Willis asked,
Have we grown SO strong, SO e~ger for a part in
world affairs, so wor1d-consclOUS that we.cannot
resist the wars that are not ours or the lntru-
sions of our philosophy on the people of Europe
who do not understand and cannot apply it?
lIe called the war a very logical one entirely explainable
10no-c»by conditions and policies of the Eastern Hemisphere,
eXpected and surprising only in that its date or the strength
of Germany or the direction of its aggression had heen some-
what miscalculated. Probably because he realized the term
17ConOTessionaJ Record (March 7, 1941) 1 1963.
(:> ,
l6rbic1" P' 211.
~
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isolationist T d b f b' W"na ecome one 0 oppro rlum, "lilis explained
that opp osed t 1 d . f h ._ 0 t 1.e o ct ri.n.e0 t.he internationalists is the
doctrine
not of isolation, but of loyalty to the nation
of realism that takes into account human natur~
and the divergent construction of people and
philosophies that places value on l~y~lty to
one home, one vow, and one nation.
Several ill-fated attempts were made to amend Lend~
Lease in the Senate so as to limit the authority and dis~
cretion of the President. The only significant amendment
passed was a modified version of a proposal originally of-
fered by Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana. As introduced
on February 18, the Ellender Amendment inserted a clause
stating that nothing in the act should be construed to give
the President any additional powers to employ United States
However ,
military forces outside the Western Hemisphere.
it was a revision of this which was finally included. The
modification, which Willis supported, stated that nothing
in the act changed existing law regarding the use of Ameri~
can ml"l"t f 19 wh.en the final vote of 60 to 31
l ary ~orces, vv
Came in the Senate on March 8, all ninety-five Senators
either voted or announced what their vote would have heen.
20
The Indiana delegation divided along party lines. Repuhli-
can Senator Willis voted nay and Democratic Senator Van Nuys
announcel vote had he been present. Senator Willis
c as a yea
l8Ib"d___2:_. , 1964-1965.
19Ibid., 1984.
--.---.
20Ibid. (March 8,1941),2097.
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was a t fpar or the grOUp of staunch isolationists including
Senat ors Arthur Vandenberg, Burton Wheeler, Gerald Nye,
Robert Taft, and Bennett Clark who opposed the measure.
After passing the btll, the Senate insisted upon its
amendments and appointed conferees to work with those from
the House to reach a compromise. However, the House leader-
s1 'l~p proposed a resolution to agree to the Senate amendments.
Following a two-hour debate on the resolution, the House ac-
cepted the bill as amended by the Senate by an overwhelming
margin of 317 to 71.21 Only three Representatives from Indi-
ana, Democrats Boehne, Larrabee, and Schulte, were with the
majority! The other nine congressmen were a part of the small
group of die-hard non~interventionists who sought to force
the bill into conference committee so that another vote could
be taken on the bill in its entirety. That same day President
Roosevelt signed the bill into law. He was authorized by
the act to sell, lease, lend, or otherwise (1ispose of under
Such terms as he thoug1"Ltproper, armS I munitions, food and
other defense articles to any country whose defense he deemed
vital to the defense of the United States. The act Eorbad.e
the Navy to convoy vessels carrying Lend-Lease equipment.
. 1 SUluluerof 1941 the t crnp o of.
During the sprlng ane
the war increased greatly. Hitler extended the combat area.
of his submarines and surface raiders and tried to stop
the f Low of American supplies to Great Britain by sending
21Ibid. (}''larch11,1941),2178.
__..........---
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his air force and u~boats into the battle of the Atlantic.
In response, Roosevelt set up a system of patrol ships to
serve, in fact, as escorts for ships carrying Lend-Lease
equipment. Me anwh i.Le, American policy toward Japan was
becoming more restrictive, mainly by the application of
economic sanctions.
The question of the future of the American army was
becoming one of great importance and urgency by this time.
In 3une of 1941 the Selective Service Act pc rm i t t ing the
Army to conscript up to 900,000 men for the period of one
year was nearly nine months old, and a modern force had not
yet been huilt up.22 It was evident that if in the autumn
of that year the men conscripted were to be discharged,
the army would disintegrate and an entirely new start would
have to be made, In a per lod of mounting cris is, the country
would have no army in the modern sense. On June 21, 1941,
President Roosevelt gave the War Department permission to
propose to Congress that the period of service be extended
and that the provision of the current law forbidding the
usc of conscripted men outside the Western Ilemisphere be
removed,23 This was in accordance with the Selective Service
Ac t wh ich had provided for extension of the service period
whenever Congress might declare the national interest to be
imperilled.
2 21A[' ... ,1111am L. Langer and S. Everett Cleason, The Un de ,
~lar:ecl lVarl 1940-1941 (New Yo rk : Harper and Brothers, 195-3"),
p , 570. .
23Ibid 7_"p.51.
69
The mere suggestion of such action evoked opposition
in the Congress. Isolationist members of both houses
pro~
tested, especially against lifting the restriction on the use
of co .nscrlpted troops beyond the hemispheric limits. Two pri-
mary ar£uments w·ere 1 .~ mace agatnst the proposed revision and ex~
tension of the act. rndiana~s Representative Landis enunci~
ated one of the principal objections when he declared,
It is important to morale at home and in camp
that the Government should keep faith with the
men whom it has conscripted, Congress made a
contract with the selectees that they stay in
service for only one year. Let US keep that
contract and let us keep our promises to the
American people.24
R.epresentative Hallec1c raised the second objection and
fear of those opposed to the proposal.
One thin
a
that disturbs me is that the request
for the ~raft extension was first coupled with
a demand that the limitation against taking our
men out of the Western Hemisphere be removed.
That demand, at least for the moment, has been
abandoned, but does the fact that it was made
indicate the intentions of those who are seek-
ing this extension? In other words, are they
afraid of an attack here at hDme or in this
hemisphere, or are.they wanting. this extension
to get ready as qUIcklr ~s pOSSIble to send
another funariean Expedltlonary Force to Eu
rore?25
The President dropped the proposal to lift the re-
st . d. rlction on the use of conscripts men overseas in return
for a promise from Administration leaders in Congress to
Work out an acceptable solution to the problem of extending
the term of service. Nevertheless, the fear had been aroused---~~24Congres~ional Ree~ (July 24, 1941), App . 3578.
25Ibid. (August 8, 1941) I 6913.
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among many that there was an intention to find an entering
wedge for use of American troops overseas.
The Military Affairs Committee in the Senate finally
accepted a declaration that the national security was im-
perilled and recommended the term of service be extended
and the limit on the number of selectees be lifted. On
August 7, 1941, the Senate approved a six.,.monthextension
of the term of service and provided for a pay raise as well
as for the release sn far as possible for men of age twenty-
The vote was 45 to 30 with Senator Van Nuys voting
eight.
with the majority this time, reversing his position from
the initial enactment of peacetime conscription.26 A state-
ment by Senator Willis was read explaining that he was un-
able to be present for the vote because he had suffered a
broken arm earlier that day. However, had he been present
he announced he would have voted against the measure. He
objected because he considered the extension of service a
breach of faith with the men conscripted. Also, Senator
Willis stated he had not been convinced the national safety
was indeed imperilled,27
In the !louse opposition to the bill was firm and
widespread, When the vote was taken on August 12, the hill
was passed by a majority of one, 203 to 202. Of the Indiana
delegation, only Democrat William Larrabee supported the
(August 7,1941),6881.
6880.
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measure as he had supported establishment of conscription
one year ear1ier.28 The other members of the delegation had
opposed the original bill and reaffirmed their opposition.
Thus~ less than four months before Pearl Harbor? only two
of the fourteen member Indiana contingent admitted the need
for the United States to have a strong military force.
The situation in the North Atlantic worsened until
Roosevelt finally gave the Navy orders to shoot on sight all
Gerrnan and Italian ships of war in the American patrol zone.
This logically led to his next step which was to ask for re-
vision of the Neutrality Act. Since the United States was,
in reality, no longer neutral and the 1939 act prevented un-
restricted aid to Great Britain, the President considered
repeal or revision urgent. On October 9, Roosevelt asked
Congress for revision to permit the arming of merchant ships
and indirectly to abolish the war zones so that American
ships could go into belligerent ports.
Even before the President appealed to Congress,
Democratic Representative Larrabee told the Congress the time
had come to consider either drastic revision or outright rc-
peal of the Neutrality Act. "The Act has been rendered in-
operative to a large extent by enactment of the Lend-Lease
Act and the remaining provisions should be repealed.!l29
Dr. Larrabee was the only member of the Indiana delegation
28rbid. (August 12, 1941), 7074.
29rbid. (October 7, 1941), App. 4536.
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to speak out in favor of further revision of the existing
neutrality legislation. On October 16, Representative Gillie
presented a petition protes~ing repeal of the Neutrality Act
bearing signa,tures of several hundred Fort 1Vayne area res i~
dents, He expressed his accord with the views of the peti-
tioners, In Gillie! s opinion, participation of the United
States as an active belligerent in the European war would
inevitably follow repeal of the Neutrality Act. While Dr.
Larrabee viewed the arming of American merchant ships as a
measure to be taken for their own protection, Gillie looked
at another aspect of the step. He asked,
WhD is to doubt that if we arm our merchant ships,
load them with munitions and send them into the
Atlantic war zones, we will not be in the war in
another year?30
The Fort Wayne Republican accused the Administration of seek~
lng the destruction of the last safeguard for peace.
Representative Ludlow exhibited his customary ve-
hemence against such measures in a speech made the day be-
fore the House voted on the resolution to repeal section
six of the Neutrality Act of 1939 which would permit the
arming of U.S. merchant ships. Ludlow was prescient in
warning that the next request would be to allow armed ships
to travel into war zones. Repeal of these neutrality mea-
sures, Ludlow predicted, would be equal to a declaration of
war.3l
30.Ibiel,(October 16 ~ 1941), 8000.
31Ibid., 7986 -7987 .
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On the following day, October 17, 1941, the House of
Representatives voted 259 to 139 to pass House Resolution
237 which repealed section six of the 1939 act. Democrats
Boehne, Larrabee, and Schulte were the only members from
Indiana to vote with the majority in favor of arming United
States merchant ships.32
When the bill reached the Senate, the Foreign Relation
Committee recommended the repeal of sections two and three
to permit armed U.S. ships to go into belligerent ports and
to remove the provisions requiring the President to define
the combat zones around warring nations into which ships
could not travel, During final debate on the bill ln the
Senate Indiana's Republican Senator Willis spoke out against, .
it. Willis reiterated the opinion expressed by Indiana's
members of the House that the arming of merchant ships would
be a certain step into the war. Pursuit of a course of actio)
which admittedly meant war assumed a cause existed for which
to fight and Senator Willis took exception to that assumption
til am against the modification of the neutrality law because
if we have any grievance with the Axis powers, we have not
exhausted the means for peaceful settlement.1'33
Senator Van Nuys, who had voted agajnst earlier ef.
forts at neutrality revision, did not comment. However, exam·
ination of the roll call votes indicates his opposition to
32Ibid. (October 17, 1941), 8041.
33Ibid. (N0vember 7, 1941), 8601.
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repeal of further sections of the Act. An amendment wa s pro-
posed to retain section three of the Act pertaining to the
definition of combat zones, Both Indiana Senators voted to
retain this section, but the amendment was defeated 50 t 78a ,) .
When the vote on the committee amendment was taken the vote
was identical except the yeas and nays were reversed so that
the amendment was accepted, The bill then passed the Senate
with sections two and three repealed as well as section six
as provided for by the House. Neither Indiana Senator voted
1n favor of the bill.34
The bill was sent back to the House for concurrence
with the Senate amendments, As could be expected, further
weakening of the Neutrality Act did not gain support for the
bill from the Indiana delegation in the llo use . Representa-
tive Landis credited the existing provisions of the Act with
success in keeping the nation out of war and saw repeal as
the final step toward active belligerency. Of even more
importance, as he viewed the situation, it was not a war
to defend his native land but a war in Europe, Asia, and
Af ri.ca which would weaken the clefensive ab i.Li tics of the
U.S. Ifl believe our participation in this war is a Catal
mi stake. ,,35 The cxh ort at ions 0 f Congre ssma n La.n d .i s we YO
not sufficiently persuasIve to his comrades as the [louse
voted the next day, November 13, 1941, to concur in the
Senate amendments to House Heso1ution 237. Ac a in only the'"
34Ibid., 8675-8680.
35Ibid. (November 12, 1941), 8802.
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Democrats Boehne, Larrabee, and Schulte voted with the
majority. The other Democrat, Ludlow, maintained his record
of complete opposition to the foreign policy of his party's
President.36
Roosevelt signed the resolution into law and from that
time armed American merchant ships carrying any kind of cargo
were free to sail for belligerent ports. With an undeclared
naval war with Germany already underway, the possibility of
future conflicts between the two countries was increased by
permitting armed American vessels to sail into combat zones.
The central objection of the isolationists that such activity
would inevitably draw the United States into full-scale war
was not given time to be proven right or wrong. Only eight
days after the President signed the new law, the Japanese at-
tack on Pearl Harbor occurred.37
President Roosevelt addressed a joint meeting of the
against Japan. All eighty-two Senators present voted ln
Congress on December 8 and asked for a declaration of war
favor of the Declaration.
In the House of Representl1.tives,
only Jeanette Rankin of Montana cast a dissenting vote.
38
who was recorded as not voting. Three days later Roosevelt
declaration of war with the exception of Dr. William Larrabee
The is01ationist-dominated Indiana delegation voted {or a
36Ibid., (November 13, 1941), 8891.
37Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth
Century Reaction (New York: 111e Free 1)res5, 1951),I). 288. --
38Congressional Record (December 8, 1941), 9506, 9536.
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asked Congress to recognize the existence of a state of war
between the United States and Germany and the United States
and Italy following Germany's declaration of war against the
United States. Once again all present Senators voted in favor
of the resolution and only Miss Rankin in the House voted
against the measure.39
Thus, the entry of the United States into another world
war came in such a manner as to unite the isolationists in Con-
gress behind a President whose foreign policy they had attacked
only a few weeks earlier.
39Ibid. (Decenilier11, 1941), 9652-53, 9665-67.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
During the years between 1939 and 1941 many Ameri-
cans, including President Roosevelt, became convinced that
the conflict in Europe revolved around significant moral
issues and that the United States had an interest in its
outcome. Consequently, there were several measures brought
before the Congress aimed at modifying U.S. foreign policy
in order to provide greater assistance to Great Britain and
the other victims of aggression. Also, the first peacetime
conscription of men for military service was proposed to as-
sure the Un5.ted States an adequate armed force. At the same
time, a resolute minority persisted in its isolationist con-
victions that America could remain aloof from the events in
the Eastern IIemisphere. The controversy between those of op-
posing views was most vividly acted out on the floor of Con-
gress where agreement did not occur until after Pearl I1arbor.
The continuing effort to achieve revision of neutrality
legislation, the passage and extension of peacetime conscrip-
tion, and Lend-Lease are the most pertinent foreign policy
issues of the years before the war. An examination of roll
call votes taken on these issues reveals that the Middle
1Vestern section of the United States was somewhat out ofl inc
77
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with the rest of the country.l Sentiment against the major
foreign policy questions was greater in that section than
elsewhere. Though the factor of political party affiliation
must be considered, sectional characteristics which transcended
party lines appeared. One study has carefully separated sec-
tionlism from party loyalty by first establishing a standard
of nation-wide party support of particular issues and then de-
veloping a profile of deviation from the party mean to make
sectional differences outstanding.2
A section by section breakdown reveals that the New
England and North Atlantic states were the most internation-
alist during the years before the war. Their congressmen
from both parties and in both houses voted most consistently
for those measures which increased the United States' COffi-
mitment to international participation. The Representatives
and Senators from the South also greatly supported the Pres-
ident's foreign policy. However, because this was the most
cult to make a distinction between regional sentiment and
solidly Democratic bloc in Congress, it becomes more diffi-
party loyalty in the case of this section.
For the Border states, both Democrats and Republicans
supported the major foreign policy programs more than did
1,VilliarnG. Carleton, "Isolationism and the Middle
West)" Mississippi Valley Historical Revi cw , XXXI II, (Decem-
ber, 19i1D);jlfS.
2George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress all
Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hnpkinsl)ress, 19~:rr:l)P.-
141-174.
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their party contingents as a whole. The Pacific Coast House
delegations favored internationalism more frequently than did
the senatorial contingent from the area. The inclusion of the
vocal isolationist Senator Hiram Johnson of California con-
tributes to the difference between House and Senate attitudes
for the Coast area.
Both the Rockv Mountain and Great Plains area delepapI 0
tions exhibited great reluctance to increase the participa-
tion of the United States in foreign affairs. However, the
Lake States of Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio most con-
sistently opposed such foreign policy measures. Legislators
of both parties from this area supported the foreign affairs
legislation of the President less than did the nation as a
The isolationist minority bloc in Congress was largelywhole.
composed of the delegations from Illinois, Michigan, Indiana,
and Ohio even though some of the more vocal anti-intervention-
ists were from outside the region. The Lake States provided
the bulk of the votes against the major foreign policy mea-
sures to come before Congress, and the Indiana delegation in
particular voted heavily against greater international parti-
cipation of the United States.
The preceding detailed examination of tllecomments and
recorded votes of the Representatives and Senators from Inrli-
ana regarding these issues reveals their minority position in
tIle Congress. Only three Representatives, Boehne, Larrabec,
and Scllulte, all Democrats, consistently voted in favor of thc
President'S foreign policy proposals. Congressman Crowe sup-
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ported the Selective Service System but both Boehne and
Schulte defected on that issue. Democratic Congressman Ludlow
and Senator Van Nuys both opposed programs supported by their
party's President. Ludlow's opposition was passionate and un
p
relenting. Thus, the attitudes of the Indiana delegation were
more than a Republican reaction to Democratic foreign policy.
Even the Republicans cannot easily be accused of mere parti-
sanship as their comments were too frequent and too zealous
to be discounted as tenacity to the party line. Nor can pres-
sure from their constituents be given as the simple explana-
tion for the voting records of the Indiana delegation. Cer-
tainly there was much anti-interventionist sentiment in Indi-
ana and this was most likely a significant factor in shaping
the attitudes of the elected representatives of the people.
However, the absence of foreign policy as a dominant issue
during the election campaigns waged in 1940 by the Representa-
tives and Senator Minton indicates that the men in Congress
held very strong convictions of their own. While the candi-
dates assailed Roosevelt's foreign policy, newspaper accounts
indicate they felt much more compelled to attack his domestic
programs as a campaign issue.
Less than a month before the Pearl Ilarbor attack only
three of the twelve members of the Indiana delegation were
willing to admit that the national interests of the United
States were linked to the success of Great Britain. The
other nine members refused to vote in favor of repeal of
three sections of the Neutrality Act which the President and
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a majority ln the Congress deemed an urgent demand.
Only after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did
a majority of the congressional delegation from Indiana admit
that the United States was not unassailable and that a uni-
lateral foreign policy was not possible. During the previous
three years their comments during floor debate and their vot-
ing records on the pertinent issues were illustrative of the
isolationist viewpoint. Therefore, the questions posed fe-
garding the attitudes of the delegation are answered in the
affirmative by this study. The majority of the Representa-
tives and Senators representing Indiana in the United States
Congress during the years immediately prior to the Second
World War favored the isolationist approach to foreign poli-
cy. Further, their attitudes do support the proposition that
isolationism was a sectional characteristic of the Middle
Western states during those years, a characteristic which
caused that region's elected representatives to be clearly
out of line with a majority of those from the rest of the
United States.
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